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Abstract
In what follows we offer a bibliographical guide of five basic books for teachers of English. We
selected two books on English grammar, one on American structural linguistics and the other on
traditional English grammar. The third one concerns English-language pedagogy. The fourth book
was chosen from a classic book of epistemology. The last one belongs to psychology.
1．Fries, C.C.：American English Grammar, 1940 ・・・・・・KASHIMA Takumi
2．Jespersen, Otto：Essentials of English Grammar, 1933 ・・・・FUJIUCHI Norimitsu
3．大津由紀雄（編著）『学習英文法を見直したい』，2012・・・・・KAWASHIMA Hirokatsu
4．Popper, K. R.：The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2002 ・・・・・HASHIMOTO Takaaki








1．Charles Carpenter Fries (1940). American English Grammar. Appleton-Century-Crofts, p.313
フリーズ（1887－1967）は戦後、日本の英語教育会に颯爽と登場した。それはアメリカ構造言語学
の波と共に。ミシガン大学のEnglish Language Institute の所長にもなり、著書や教育を通じて構造
主義言語学に基づいた外国語教育の普及に大きな影響を与えた。1956年（昭和31年）の来日を機にオー
ラル・アプローチへの関心が高まることとなった。
American English Grammar は、手紙文を資料として分析することで現代英語の実態を明らかに
するという統計的調査研究である。米国における英語教育は米国の標準英語を教授されなければなら









I 62 26 15 11
II 50 32 28 4
III 81 53 31 22
IV 14 8 3 5
V 26 18 8 10
VI 31 25 18 7
VII 48 33 26 7
312 195 129 66
ないので、そのためには米国の標準英語の実態を正しく把握する必要があるという考えに基づいてい
る。本書では、米国政府が保管する3，000通の手紙を分析している。手紙の差出人を学歴や職業など
を基準に標準英語（Group I, “standard” English）、普通英語（Group II, “popular” or “common”




A. We must agree upon the kind of English which it is the obligation of the schools to teach.
B. We must agree to base our teaching upon an accurate, realistic description of the actual practices
of informal Standard English and eliminate from our language programs all those matters of
dispute for which there is any considerable usage in informal Standard English.
C. We must agree to stimulate among our pupils observation of actual usage and to go as far as
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1000年 1200年 1300年 1400年 1500年
Accusative-object before verb
(O-V)
52．5％ 53．7％ 40＋％ 14．3％ 1．87％
Accusative-object after verb
(V-O)
47．5％ 46．3％ 60‐％ 85．7％ 98．13％
英語は総合的な言語（Synthetic language）から分析的な言語（Analytic language）へと変化して








かった。時代はチョムスキ （ーNoam Chomsky1928－ ）が変形生成文法（Transformational Generative
Grammar）の誕生を世間に示した Syntactic Structure（1957）の先駆けとなるLogical Structure of
Linguistic Theory（1955）の出版が目の前に迫っていた。
2．Otto Jespersen (1933). Essentials of English Grammar. Routledge, ISBN-10: 0415104408,
ISBN-13: 978-0415104401, p.388
英語には second best という表現がある。Essentials of English Grammar（通称 Essentials）は、
Jespersen の歴史的名著、Modern English Grammar（通称MEG）の要点をまとめた、いわば second
best である。確かにMEGは科学的伝統文法最良の文法書ではあるが、一般には入手困難である。そ
のため、その要約版であっても、一般に手に入れやすいEssentials は、決して second best ではなく、
英語の研究に携わるすべての研究者と学生が持っているべき最良の本の一つといえる。
科学的英文法とはいっても、MEG出版当時は、一般名詞に目的格を認めるか認めないかを、





























の別の語への従属関係によって定められるものである。terribly cold weather という名詞句において
は、その内部の三つの語の中で、weather が最も重要で、weather に直接従属してその様態を述べる










(1) The sea went mountains high.
(2) Lady Cecily, part pleased, part amused, part sympathetic.




this furiously barking dog という名詞句を三階位分析すると、dog が一位語、this と barking は二
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位語、furiously は三位語である。一方で、上記の名詞句と派生関係にあるThis dog barks furiously．
においても、上記の分析は並行することができ、dog が一位語、その様態を表す述語 barks が並行的
に二位語、this も二位語、furiously は三位語である。それぞれの例において、二位語の一位語への接





(3) a silly person = a fool
ところで、this と barking は同じ二位語でありながら、線形順序では連続していない。Jespersen
はこの事実を、語の階位は一位語に対する相対的位置に依るものではないとのみ説明しているが、実






(4) my book = my one = mine
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表1 意味順と5文型・7文型
意味順 だれが する（です） だれ・なに どこ いつ
1．SV She smiled.
2．SVC She became a teacher 20 years ago.
3．SVO She opened the door.
4．SVOO She gave him a watch.
5．SVOC She made me her secretary.
6．SVA She lives in Tokyo now.
































4．Karl R. Popper (2002). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Routledge. Pp. xxvii, 513.
ISBN 0-415-27844-9 (paperback)
Language instructors are researchers and practitioners at the same time: They are engaged in
research into the mechanism of language learning and conducting experiments on the effect of their
educational intervention, as they teach their classes daily. With increased attention being paid to
continuous improvement of instruction through the PDCA cycle, instructors are now required to
justify the way they teach in the planning stage, and then they are also required to evaluate the results
and adjust the way they teach after they have executed their instructional plan.
Justification of teaching practices requires language instructors to critically evaluate and relate
their practices with the results of the preceding language learning/teaching research, which in turn
requires them to be familiar with research methodology. Understanding of research methodology is
also essential in conducting formative evaluation on the on-going educational intervention. Therefore,
the readers may find interests in Karl Popper’s (2002) classic in the methodology of empirical science,
The logic of scientific discovery. The book is philosophical rather than practical, and it is certainly not
a how-to manual of research methods. Nevertheless, the reviewer believes that the familiarity with
the ideas underlying the method of empirical research is indispensable for fully understanding second
language literature and the procedure of formative evaluation.
The book reviewed here is the English translation of the author’s original publication in German,
Logik der Forschung, first published in 1934. The English translation of the book, prepared by the
author of the book, was first published in 1959, and it has undergone several minor revisions and the
addition of appendices. The book is considered a foundational work in epistemology which introduced
the basic principles of the method of empirical science.
The book consists of 10 chapters extending over 311 pages with additional 177 pages of
appendices and 25 pages of index. The content of some of the chapters and the appendices is very
technical, and it is difficult to understand the details fully without a knowledge of logic, mathematics,
and theoretical physics. Nevertheless, Part I of the book (Chapters 1 and 2) is very readable, and it
conspicuously presents the methodological principles of empirical science.
In the early 20th century, it was commonly believed that a certain inductive method applied to a
set of data would lead to a correct generalization over the data, and researchers were making efforts
to formalize the inductive method leading to a discovery. An inference is called “inductive” if it makes
a universal statement on the basis of particular observations or experiments. However, it is not clear
if it is justified to make a universal statement on the basis of singular statements (of facts confirmed
through observations or experiments), no matter how many singular statements may be shown to be
true. The problem of induction is the question of whether inductive inferences are justified, and if so,
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under what conditions.
If inductive inferences are to be justified, then it is necessary to establish a principle of induction
by which one can present inductive inferences in a logically acceptable form. The formulation of this
principle was taken to be the most important issue by the upholders of inductive logic, because
without the principle, science would not be able to distinguish between true theories and false theories.
The principle of inductive logic cannot be logical transformation of a statement to another
because if it were, induction reduces to logical deduction, and there would be no problem of inductive
logic. Therefore, the principle of inductive logic itself must be a synthetic statement, which in
principle can be false. Then, the synthetic statement in turn must be justified on some rational
grounds, which is logically impossible.
The principle of inductive logic is necessary to justify induction, which involves making a
universal statement on the basis of singular statements that are known to be true. However, the
principle of inductive logic itself must be a universal statement, and if the truth of the principle is to be
known from experience, which can render only singular statements true or false, then the justification
of the principle must appeal to another principle of a higher order. The justification of the principle
will then lead to infinite regress.
Popper points out that in principle, there cannot be such a principle of induction that allows for
justification of a universal statement on the basis of true singular statements. In order to solve
epistemological problems that arise from inductive logic, Popper proposes a deductive method of
testing theories. He believes that one cannot arrive at a true generalization through some inductive
procedure, and that one can only test hypotheses that are deductively generated from a given idea and
falsify the idea on the basis of experience. The deductive testing of theories proceeds as follows.
From a new idea (a hypothesis or a theoretical system) not justified in anyway, conclusions or
statements are drawn by logical deduction. The statements are then tested against the conditions on
the statements in empirical science. Popper presents the four conditions that statements in empirical
science must satisfy.
a). The statements deduced from hypotheses of a theory must be consistent among themselves; i.e.,
they must represent a logically possible world.
b). The theory must constitute a scientific advance; i.e., it must achieve the goals of science better than
other competing theories.
c). The statements in a theory of empirical science must be empirical in character, by being synthetic
statements (derived from axioms and non-axiomatic statements), not just tautological deductions
from axioms, so that singular statements (predictions) deduced from universal statements of the
theory (hypotheses) can be contradicted by facts. They must represent a world of possible
experience.
d). The singular statements deduced from a hypothesis must be corroborated by the facts; i.e., they
must represent the real world.
Condition (c) is the principle of falsifiability. Falsifiability is the demarcation criterion that
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distinguishes between empirical science and metaphysics. Condition (d) is the principle of
corroboration. Corroboration leaves the tested hypothesis a possibility of being a correct
representation of the real world.
Popper claims that the goal of empirical science is to elucidate the problems of the current theory
to make ever lasting revisions of the theory of the real world, and not to achieve some conclusively
verified true statements, as positivists envisaged. Universal statements about the real world do not
need to be, and in principle, cannot be both verifiable and falsifiable, because only singular statements
about specific events can be verified by facts, and because an accumulation of singular statements
cannot deduce a universal statement. Thus, even if a singular statement about the real world that is
consistent with the universal statements is accepted as true, the universal statements are not shown
to be true but are left not yet shown to be false. Meanwhile, universal statements can be falsified, if a
singular statement that contradicts the universal statements is accepted as true. While there is no
logical method of conceiving a hypothesis, there is a way to test a hypothesis, once it has been
conceived. Thus, universal statements in empirical science can be refuted by facts.
Strictly universal statements (i.e., hypotheses) of a theory of empirical science can be expressed in
the form of negations of strictly existential statements. The statement “For all X, X has property Y” is
equivalent to “It is not that case that for some X, X has property not-Y.” Strictly universal statements
in a theory of empirical science do not assert that something exists or something is the case. Instead,
they insist on the non-existence of certain things or events. Since a singular statement of the non-
existence of certain things or events can be contradicted by a singular observation of such a thing or
such an event, this provides a hypothesis with falsifiability.
Strictly existential statements are unfalsifiable, because only a universal statement can contradict
them, and because a universal statement can never be verified. Therefore, strictly existential
statements are not statements in empirical science.
Scientific statements can be corroborated (i.e., not contradicted) by facts, even though they cannot
be verified. The method of empirical science requires that a hypothesis be testable (i.e., falsifiable), and
that the hypothesis undergo repeated tests, once it has been posited, until it is falsified or otherwise
superseded by another hypothesis that is better in terms of the falsifiablity of the claim.
The methodological principles that Popper presents are those that the readers are probably
familiar with, having been introduced to them in science courses in high school or elsewhere, and they
will probably be surprised to learn that such foundational methodological principles were not
commonly recognized until the mid-20th century. Meanwhile, it is also surprising that the deductive
method of theory testing is often not observed by researchers in the field of second language research.
The readers would often encounter, in second language research literature, unfalsifiable claims
(strictly existential statements), ignored counterexamples, and unjustified conclusions uncorroborated
(i.e., contradicted) by the data. The book provides a solid point of view from which language
instructors can critically evaluate studies in second language learning/teaching before applying the
ideas taken from the studies to their teaching practices. It will also assist language instructors with
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the design of the evaluation procedure in the PDCA cycle. The reviewer believes that Popper’s classic
work provides anyone engaged in second language research and language teaching with a good
reference point in reviewing his/her own research and instructional practices.
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